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The Manufacturer's Duty To Warn-
A Higher Order of Enterprise Responsibility
This is a day of synthetic living, when to an ever-increasing extent
our population is dependent upon mass producers for its food and drink,
its cures and complexions, its apparel and gadgets. These no longer are
natural or simple products but complex ones whose composition and
qualities are often secret. Such a dependent society must exact greater
care than in more simple days and must require from manufacturers or
producers increased integrity and caution as the only protection of its
safety and wellbeing.1
In response to the needs of this dependent society, the courts have
drastically expanded the doctrines of manufacturer's liability. There
was a time when the concept of privity stood between the injured
plaintiff and his compensation unless the harmful product was "immi-
nently dangerous. '"2 Today, the imminent danger test is virtually
emasculated,3 and privity is on its way out, even in actions based upon
warranty.4 Less familiar, perhaps, but no less important, is the ex-
tension of the duty of manufacturers to warn of the dangers of their
products.
The new height of the standard of labeling is well illustrated by
the 1958 decision, Braun v. Roux Distributing Company.5 Mrs.
Braun regularly tinted her hair with defendant's preparation, "Roux
Oil Shampoo Tint." She had read the instructions that came with
the shampoo, which instructions told her:
Caution - This product contains ingredients which may cause skin
irritation on certain individuals and a preliminary test according to
accompanying directions should first be made. This product must not
be used for dying the eyelashes or eyebrows; to do so may cause blind-
ness.
6
Mrs. Braun made the prescribed "patch test," and having no reaction,
she applied the dye according to instructions. She later used the
product to retouch her hair. There was no recommendation of a
skin test for subsequent applications of the tint. She developed a
severe toxic reaction, in the nature of an allergy. The manufacturer
had no knowledge that any ingredient of the shampoo could cause
1. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 51 (1953) (dissenting opinion of Jackson, J.).
2. Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
3. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946); MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
4. Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, 149 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958); Davis v.
Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920).
5. 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958).
6. 1d. at 760.
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systemic illness, as opposed to skin allergy; however in the suit against
the Roux Company, articles in technical journals were presented
which expressed opinion that a chemical ingredient of the product
was dangerous. Testimony tended to show that one-twentieth to one-
fifth of one percent of the population might be allergic to this sub-
stance. Judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed on the
basis that the warning to the purchaser was inadequate.
Such recent cases as this have caused at least one writer to ques-
tion whether the theory involved is really negligence, or whether a
"new tort" involving absolute liability has not evolved.7 It is sug-
gested that the significance of this case lies not so much in doctrinal
departure as in its demonstration of a trend: the raising of the stand-
ard of care imposed upon manufacturers. The requirement that pro-
ducers of goods must warn of the hazards foreseeable in their use is
not new. Thirteen years before the decision of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Company," it was held that a manufacturer who knows that
his product is imminently dangerous if used as intended is liable for
failure to warn the remote user that such danger exists.'
Generally, the duty to warn has kept pace with other facets of
product liability. The old rule that a remote purchaser could not re-
cover from the manufacturer unless the product was "imminently
dangerous," has given way in large measure to the more easily satis-
fied prerequisite that danger be foreseeable ;10 and lack of knowledge
of the harmful quality of a preparation will seldom excuse its maker
from failing to warn of those dangers of which he should have
known." The decisions of the past few years have not added new
elements to the tort; rather they have insisted that the producer take
far greater pains to know the peculiarities of his product, and to ad-
vertise such peculiarities prominently and in detail.
In Ohio, while there have been no important cases on the duty to
warn, 2 the legislature, in 1959, enacted a series of statutes requiring
comprehensive labeling for a wide variety of hazardous substances. 3
The duty to warn received exhaustive attention in an article by Dil-
lard and Hart in the 1955 issue of the Virginia Law Review.'
7. BELLI, TRIAL AND TORT TREND - 1958 BELLI SEMINAR p. lxix (1959).
8. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 NE. 1050 (1916).
9. Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903); Cf. Genesee
County Patrons Fire Relief Ass'n v. L. Sonneborn Bros., Inc., 263 N.Y. 463, 189 N.E. 551
(1934).
10. Orr v. Shell Oil Co., 177 S.W.2d 608 (Mo. 1944).
11. Cf. Farley v. Edward E. Tower Co., 271 lass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930).
12. A few cases hint at recognition of the duty to warn. See Keyes v. Konald, 26 Ohio L.
Abs. 382 (Ct. App. 1937); see also Sicard v. Kremer, 133 Ohio St. 291, 13 N.E.2d 250
(1938).
13. Omo REv. CODE, ch. 3716 (Supp. 1959).
14. Dillard & Hart, Product Liabiity: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L
REV. 145 (1955).
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Rather than to review all of the law on this subject, it is the purpose
of this article to illustrate some of the major advances presented by
a few recent cases, and also, very briefly, to indicate the possible ef-
fects of the new Ohio statutes upon civil liability for failure to warn.
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE HAZARD
Braun v. Roux Distributing Company'15 points to the demise of
an anachronism: actual knowledge by the manufacturer of the harm-
ful characteristics of the product as a precondition to imposing the
duty to warn. The early cases stated the duty in terms of warning
of dangers of which the manufacturer had knowledge." It is funda-
mental, of course, that to impose a duty which may be avoided by
studied ignorance is to take less than a long step toward public safety.
Consequently, it did not take long for the test to become, in most situ-
ations, and in most jurisdictions, whether the defendant should have
known that the goods would cause harm.. 7 Even where actual knowl-
edge remained a theoretical necessity, at least one jurisdiction adopted
a presumption that the producer knows the nature of his product. 8
All this was not true, however, in the allergy cases. Situations
such as that presented in the Braun case have typically resulted in
much confused thinking. Because of the virtual infinity of possible
allergens, and because of the statistical improbability that any given
user will be injured by a particular sensitizer, the courts have been
reluctant to apply the ordinary doctrines of negligence. The early
cases became hopelessly mired in the morass of proximate cause. A
Texas court, in Walstrom Optical Company v. Miller,9 announced
that an allergy resulting from a dye in an eyeglass frame was the
proximate result, not of any failure to warn of the sensitizing tenden-
cies of the dye, but rather of the plaintiff's hypersensitivity. As sug-
gested by one annotator, this is very much like saying that the proxi-
mate cause of an automobile accident is not defendant's negligence,
but the presence of the plaintiff under his wheels. °
While more recent decisions have considered liability for allergies
from the standpoint of foreseeability of the reaction,2 1 as recently as
15. 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958).
16. Heizer v. Kingsland & Douglass Mfg. Co., 110 Mo. 605, 19 S.W. 630 (1892); Well-
ington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64 (1870).
17. Cf. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Baridon, 73 F.2d 26, 29 (8th Cir. 1934).
18. Thornton v. Carpenter-Morton Co., 220 Mass. 593, 108 N.E. 474 (1915); in Sylvania
Elec. Products v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956),
defendant was charged with knowledge that breathing beryllium was dangerous. Sometimes
knowledge is imputable from circumstances. Cf. Clement v. Crosby & Co., 148 Mich. 293,
111 N.W. 745 (1907).
19. 59 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
20. 49 MicH. L. REv. 253 (1950).
21. See Bennett v. Pilot Products Co., 120 Utah 474, 235 P.2d 525 (1951). Cleary v. John
M. Manis Co., 173 Misc. 954, 19 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1940) applied the literal language of the
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1949, it has been held that the manufacturer is not liable without
actual awareness of the propensity of the product for causing the al-
lergic reaction.22 In this regard, then, the Braun case becomes highly
significant. In Braun, the notion that knowledge is necessary was ex-
pressly rejected. The court said:
[I]n manufacturing and distributing hair dye, the appellant is held to
the skill of an expert in that particular business,... and is bound to keep
reasonably abreast of scientific knowledge and discoveries concerning
his field and, of course, is deemed to possess whatever knowledge is
thereby imparted 23
Since the "scientific knowledge" introduced in this case consisted of
twenty-three obscure articles in medical periodicals, the fair inference
is not merely that ignorance is no longer an excuse, but also, that
whether the defendant should have known may be determined by
looking to the information possessed by the most advanced technician
whose research is available.
While undeniably striking, this decision is consonant with the
needs of modern society. The manufacturer will usually have ex-
pertise at his fingertips. The consumer, on the other hand, is ordi-
narily helpless. Injury can be minimized only by imposing a duty up-
on the producer to learn what he may through careful study and
arduous testing before putting a product upon the market. Assum-
ing that the tests of foreseeability can be met, lack of knowledge
ought not to excuse the manufacturer who could have known.
FORESEEABILITY
Foreseeability, in the context of the duty to warn, has many as-
pects. Is the harmful quality of the product foreseeable? Is such
use of the product as will elicit its dangerous nature foreseeable? If
instructions for use are given, is it to be anticipated that someone may
not follow them and thereby suffer injury? If the product is safe for
most persons, must the manufacturer take cognizance of the idiosyn-
cracies of the remaining few? Where foreseeability is clear, liability
follows with ease. It is not hard to fix blame upon the maker of a
threshing machine which has over its blades a catwalk of such thin
metal that a man of normal weight collapses it ;24 nor is it difficult to
find negligent the manufacturer of a party dress that bursts into
flame upon the slightest touch of a cigarette;25 or the manufacturer
MacPherson case and held that there must be knowledge that danger is probable. Did proba-
bility of danger ever mean that over 50% of the users must suffer?
22. Briggs v. National Industries, 92 Cal. App. 2d 542, 207 P.2d 110 (1949); see Gerkin v.
Brown & Sehler Co., 177 Mich. 45, 143 N.W. 48 (1913) which allowed recovery where
manufacturer had actual knowledge of a high percentage of sensitivity.
23. Braun v. Roux Distributing Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958). For contrary arguments
see Bonowski v. Revlon, Inc., 100 N.W.2d 5 (Iowa, 1959).
24. Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
25. Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc., 268 App. Div. 149, 49 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1944).
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of a grinding wheel that flies apart when turned at ordinary speed,26
when such manufacturers do not give notice of the infirmities of their
wares. Cases permitting recovery where the inherent danger ap-
peared in the course of typical and expected use of the product are
legion,2 7 and need little comment.
In most actions predicated upon failure to warn, the item was used
as intended by the producer. Where the product is harmful only if
used in an unintended manner, the question becomes whether the haz-
ardous use was foreseeable. For example, the maker of a baling ma-
chine intended that hay should be fed into it by throwing from a dis-
tance, but failed to warn of the consequence of getting too close. A
worker who fed the machine by pressing the hay into it by hand was
permitted to recover when his hand was caught in its rolls. 28  In a
more extreme case, a manufacturer sold two products for the same
purpose: the heat-treating of steel. Each of the mixtures alone was
safe, but together they were highly explosive. In Tingey v. E. F.
Houghton & Company,29 a workman who was injured upon mixing
the two products collected damages because of the inadequate
warning.
On several occasions the manufacturer has claimed that the duty
to warn is satisfied by the giving of instructions, and that if the plain-
tiff does not follow the instructions, his recovery is barred. While
this contention was accepted in E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Com-
pany v. Baridon,3 ° the trend has been to the contrary. As was well-
explained in the leading work on this subject, by Dillard and Hart,
instructions for use typically relate to efficiency, rather than to the
avoidance of harm."' Were an explosion to follow the grossest error
in combining the ingredients of a cake mix, there is little doubt that
the defense that instructions were given would not succeed. It should
not be surprising, therefore, that a manufacturer has been held liable
where he instructed the user as to the correct method of operating an
old-fashioned automobile starting-crank, but failed to warn of the
possibility of kick-back. The most famous case on the relation be-
tween instructions and warning is McClanahan v. California Spray-
Chemical Corporation.33 In this case a manufacturer produced a new
variety of chemical spray which the plaintiff applied to his apple
26. Tomao v. A. P. De Sanno & Son, Inc., 209 F.2d 544 (1954).
27. See for example: Beadles v. Servel, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N.E.2d 405 (1951), in
which a refrigerator gave off carbon monoxide. See also, Altorfer Bros. Co. v. Green, 236
Ala. 427, 183 So. 415 (1938); Annot. 86 A.L.R. 947 (1933).
28. Wichman v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 117 F. Supp. 857 (W.D. Mo. 1954).
29. 30 Cal. 2d 97, 179 P.2d 807 (1947).
30. 73 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1934).
31. Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L.
Rev. 145 (1955).
32. Martin v. Maxwell-Brisco Motor Vehicle Co., 158 Mo. App. 188, 138 S.W. 65 (1911).
33. 194 Va. 842, 75 S.E.2d 712 (1953).
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oichard. The spray came with instructions as to the proper time of
year for its application. The label further cautioned the user: "Do
not use this product" later than the time limited in the instructions.
Neither the label nor the accompanying pamphlet warned of the dan-
ger to the trees from noncompliance with the instructions. Plaintiff
used the spray in accordance with the schedule he had learned for use
with sprays previously sold in the area. His orchard was ruined.
The appellate court overturned a decision that plaintiff's misapplica-
tion of the product barred his recovery. Danger from foreseeable
misuse was held to be within the scope of the duty to warn.
There was no question in McClanahan, nor is there in most cases,
but that the manufacturer well knew the potential of his product for
harm. The issue of foreseeability related not to the product's harm-
fulness, but rather to the likelihood that it would be used in such a
way as to bring forth this destructive characteristic. The added bur-
den placed upon the manufacturer in the McClanahan case does not
call for more careful production, better analysis, nor more testing.
The duty can be satisfied simply by affixing a better label to the pack-
age. Where the obligation is so easily discharged, it should cause no
alarm that the standard is high.
With this background, it is possible to appreciate the significance
of the recent decisions which have extended the duty to label beyond
hitherto accepted limits of foreseeability. In Martin v. Bengue, 4 the
plaintiff had suffered from a heavy cold. He applied defendant's
balm, known as "Ben-Gay," to his chest, and over his ailing thorax
he replaced his pajama top. The "Ben-Gay" vapors that had ac-
cumulated between his chest and the pajama top burst into a flash
fire while he tried to light a cigarette. There was no warning of
combustibility on the label, but, at trial it was demonstrated that
"Ben-Gay" will not ignite at ordinary temperatures. The fire in this
case was made possible only because the air-space between the pa-
jamas and their wearer was constricted, permitfing a build-up of tem-
perature. The trial court found that the fire was unforeseeable as
a matter of law. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed that
decision, holding that the evidence permitted a finding that defendant
should have known that users of the preparation would smoke, and
would wear clothing.
Foreseeability assumes a different meaning in the allergy cases.
Of course there is no duty to warn of the possibility of an allergic
reaction if there is no reason to anticipate such a reaction, but assum-
ing that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the presence
of an allergen in his product, must he act upon the foreseeability of
harm to only a few of its potential users? As recently as 1951, a
court said "no." In Bennett v. Pilot Products Company, 5 there was
34. 25 N.J. 359,136A.2d 626 (1957).
35. 120 Utah 474, 235 P.2d 525 (1951).
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evidence that one-tenth of one per cent of the potential users would
be allergic to the product. The court held that a reaction was un-
foreseeable as a matter of law. Six years later, a court permitted re-
covery where the manufacturer of the deodorant, "Arrid," had re-
ceived 373 complaints of dermatitis during a period in which over 82
million jars were sold.36 The opinion reasoned that while the manu-
facturer, under these circumstances, could not be required to alter the
formula, it could be compelled to warn "those few persons who it
knows cannot apply the product without serious injury.' 37 Among
the factors considered by the court was the ease of giving notice. In
the light of this factor, improbability of injury loses its appeal as an
argument in favor of the defendant.
THE ADEQUACY OF WARNING
The duty to warn is not discharged by a warning which is insuffi-
cient to apprise a reasonably prudent man of the danger to be appre-
hended. Mere listing of the ingredient naphtha on the label of a sol-
vent is not adequate warning that the solvent is highly explosive,3
and despite folk wisdom to the effect that where there is smoke there
is fire, an admonition that the user should keep a smoke-making de-
vice away from the face does not suffice to warn him of the danger
of flame.39 The trend toward a higher standard of care finds mani-
festation in increasingly stringent requirements of specific warning.4"
In Tampa Drug Company v. Wait,41 a Florida case decided in 1958,
the following caveat appeared on the label of a bottle of carbon tetra-
chloride cleaning fluid:
Volatile Solvent - Vapor Harmful
Use with adequate ventilation -
Avoid prolonged or repeated contact
with skin.
A judgment for plaintiff, who had read the label but was poisoned
while using the liquid, was affirmed. The court held that the sub-
stance was so toxic that a jury could find such warning inadequate.
In connection with the previously discussed relation between warn-
ing and instructions, it may be seen that while this label displayed
many words, the only words evincing warning were "Vapor Harm-
ful." All else amounted merely to negative instruction. Would not
the words "highly dangerous poison" have better served to bring
36. Wright v. Carter Products, Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957).
37. Id. at 58-59.
38. Standard Oil Co. v. Lyons, 130 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1942).
39. Larramendy v. Myres, 126 Cal. App. 2d 636, 272 P.2d 824 (1954).
40. A pioneer case is Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945).
"Caution ... Db not inhale fumes" was held insufficient to warn of the dangers of carbon
tetrachloride where the prominently displayed name of the product was "Safety-Kleen."
41. 103 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1958).
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home the need for all this caution? In view of the severity of the
potential harm, such a decision is hardly unreasonable.
In Haberly v. Reardon,4 the offensive product was a cement base
paint. The directions said:
Caution: Inasmuch as the alkalinity of Bondex may be irritating to
tender or sensitive skin, it is advisable to use a paddle for mixing.
The young plaintiff lost the use of one eye when his father accidental-
ly brushed it with the paint. It was held that a jury could find that
the warning could be construed as "an assurance that the only danger
in the use of Bondex was that it might have a slightly irritating effect
upon a tender skin after prolonged contact.""4
This label, like the carbon tetrachloride label in the previous case,
did not suffer from brevity; it was rather long. Like the carbon
tetrachloride label, however, it was at least euphemistic. The words
"highly caustic" would have taken less space and conveyed much
more. While the explanation for such politely veiled warnings, in
some few cases, may be lack of foresight by the manufacturer, the
conclusion is impelling that these labels reflect nothing more than
fear of alarming the market. If the everyday truths that cement
burns holes in things, and that carbon tetrachloride is a killer, were
revealed, sales might decline. Irrespective of the validity of this
fear, to permit the sale of goods to continue at the price of injuries
that could easily have been prevented is practically to condone fraud.
From these recent holdings, the principle emerges that it is not
enough to warn of the ordinary consequences of use; the consumer
must be apprised of the worst that can be foreseen. Here too, the
harshness of the duty is strongly mitigated by the ease of its dis-
charge. All that is demanded is the use of language and imagination.
RESTRICTED DEFENSES
Among the benefits to be obtained by the injured plaintiff who
grounds his action upon failure to warn is the severe limitation upon
the defenses available to the manufacturer. Speaking of contributory
negligence and assumption of risk, Dillard and Hart say:
Though these time-honored defenses are frequently invoked to defeat
recovery, they are theoretically inapplicable when the defendant's breach
of duty is based on a failure to warn. To allow these defenses is to
indulge in circular reasoning, since usually the plaintiff cannot be said
to have assumed a risk of which he was ignorant or to have contributed
to his own injury when he had no way of reasonably ascertaining that
the danger of injury existed. 44
42. 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).
43. Id. at 867.
44. Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Diectioms for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. I.
Rnv. 145, 163 (1955).
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These writers suggest that if the danger should have been perceived,
failure to warn was not the proximate cause of the injury. This
would appear to be equally true whether the danger was apparent
from the contents of the label or from the nature of the product.
This analysis has been approved in at least one decision.45
Where the danger is apparent, there is ordinarily no duty to
warn.46 Whether the plaintiff should know of the danger, of course,
must be determined in connection with the experience of the class of
persons likely to use the product.4' A cement product may be danger-
ous when distributed to household consumers who may not be aware
of the caustic qualities of lime,48 while a similar preparation, distri-
buted to the building trades, needs no accompanying warning.49
This rule that patent dangers need not be advertised by the pro-
ducer seems to arise from the very nature of the duty to warn, and
has almost never been questioned. Nevertheless, there may be cir-
cumstances in which a warning is indicated to remind the user of fa-
miliar hazards which may not be at the forefront of his attention. In
at least one decision, the trier of fact was permitted to find that a
reasonable manufacturer would have anticipated the forgetfulness of
the person expected to use the product. ° Infection had been intro-
duced into the plaintiff's body via the hypodermic injection of an im-
pure milk preparation produced by the defendant. The doctor who
administered the injection saw the coagulated condition of the sub-
stance and later testified that he knew that it was unsafe in that con-
dition, but that the hazard slipped his mind at the time. In affirm-
ing judgment for plaintiff, the federal court of appeals said:
Sometimes it is well to have our attention called to the things we know
best, and that is well illustrated by this doctor's testimony. With knowl-
edge that coagulated Lactigen should not be administered, he did not
observe the contents of the ampule, with that in mind.51
An often tempting argument for the defense is the speculation
that no warning, however complete, would have averted the accident.
45. Wright v. Carter Products, Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cit. 1957).
46. Where the manufacturer has adequately warned of the hazard, the duty to warn is satis-
fied. Suppose the manufacturer of a dangerous ingredient notifies his purchaser of the haz-
ard, but continues to sell the product to him despite strong reason to believe that the purchaser
is selling to the public without warning. In Nishida v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 245
F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1957), the court held that the manufacturer had a right to believe that the
warning would be heeded.
47. The problem has often arisen with regard to sales of medical supplies and equipment to
physicians. The usual holding is that the physician should know the nature of any purchase,
and need not be warned. See Parker v. State, 201 Misc. 759, 105 N.Y.S.2d 735 (1951), afjd,
208 App. Div. 157, 112 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1952), appeal denied, 280 App. Div. 562, 115
N.Y.S.2d 311 (1952).
48. Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).
49. Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731 (1959).
50. Abbott Laboratories v. Lapp, 78 F.2d 170, (7th Cir. 1935).
51. Id. at 176.
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This approach has been unsuccessful. Returning to the case of the
boy who was blinded by the brush loaded with caustic paint,52 the de-
fendant argued that a man should know not to get things in his eyes,
so that a warning to that effect would be superfluous; the freak acci-
dent might well have happened even though the brush-wielder had
known of the precise danger. Rejecting this argument, the court prop-
erly observed that a specific warning of tragic consequences might
alert a man to act far differently than would his ordinary desire to
keep his eyes clear of foreign substances.5"
Since a warning, to be effective at all, demands response from the
person warned, the defendant can not argue that proximate cause is
absent because the warning, if given, might not have been heeded.
Such an argument, if allowed, would defeat every case. The contrary
assumption, that warning would have averted the accident, is implicit
in each decision for plaintiff, and renders each such recovery at least
slightly conjectural.
A particularly interesting set of facts is presented by the case of
the garage mechanic who was injured because of the faulty brakes of
a car which was being repaired by a co-worker. In a suit against the
manufacturer for failure to disclose the defect to the purchaser, the
reviewing court refused to find that the failure to warn was not the
proximate cause of the accident.5" Recovery was allowed on the
theory that had the purchaser been aware of the defective brakes he
would have fixed them before they failed. While the facts of this
case are extreme, the principle appears correct. If the manufacturer
has not done all he should to publicize the danger of using his prod-
uct, the victim of this laxity should be able to resolve in his own favor
all speculations as to what would have happened had warning been
given.
THE DUTY TO WARN AND THE DEFECTIVE PRODUCT
In the typical situation in which the manufacturer's breach of duty
consists of failure to warn, there is no negligence in fabricating or
marketing the item. If a proper label is placed upon the bottle, the
common law does not prevent the making and selling of the most dan-
gerous poison or the most violent explosive. Absent warning, the
same act becomes negligent. On the other side of the coin, where
the product is negligently designed or manufactured, and consequent-
ly defective, failure to warn is not often the essence of the victim's
complaint. Nevertheless, some of the most promising applications of
the failure to warn theory have been in instances where the product
52. Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).
53. Id. at 867.
54. Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
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was defective and action might have been grounded upon negligent
manufacture.
For example, in one case the defendant had put out a caustic soda
mixture for use as a drain cleaner. The batch which plaintiff pur-
chased contained more of one ingredient than defendant's formula
prescribed, and the contents of the drain pipe blew up in plaintiff's
face.55 The plaintiff did not prove that the manufacturer failed to
use ordinary care in mixing or testing the product; recovery was
grounded instead upon the failure to warn of the product's danger-
ous nature. In another instance, the plaintiff was able to avoid all
sorts of complex scientific questions as to the defendant's negligence
in designing a carbon dioxide fire extinguisher for use on commercial
aircraft by showing that the defendant had evidence that the product
was toxic, and concealed this fact from the purchaser.56
Comstock v. General Motors Corporation,"7 the case previously
referred to, involving the garage mechanic who was injured by de-
fective brakes, presents the most far-reaching application of the duty
to warn in the defective product situation. In this setting, a more
detailed description of the facts becomes necessary. In 1953, Gen-
eral Motors had difficulties with the newly developed power brakes
installed in its Buick line. The design of the brakes was such that
they tended to fail suddenly and without warning. Learning of this
deficiency, General Motors issued repair kits to all Buick dealers and
instructed them to repair the brakes on cars brought in for service
regardless of whether such repair was requested. No warning was
given to purchasers, nor was warning attempted. Leon Friend
bought a Buick equipped with these brakes and drove it for 6,000
miles. His brakes failed one day, but he drove carefully, and, avoid-
ing any accident, arrived at the garage where plaintiff-to-be was em-
ployed. Friend told another employee that he had no brakes, and
left the scene. A few minutes later that same mechanic, forgetting
that the car could not be stopped, went to move it, and drove it into
plaintiff. Suit was brought against General Motors for negligently
failing to warn the purchaser. Despite the fact that the Buick had
been sold before the defect was discovered by the manufacturer, and
despite the obvious intervening negligence of the fellow employee,
the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed a directed verdict for de-
fendant, holding that the manufacturer had a duty to warn.
The proximate cause aspect of this decision has already been men-
55. Kieffer v. Blue Seal Chemical Co., 196 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1952).
56. De Vito v. United Air Lines, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1951). This aspect of the
case was discussed in Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to
Warn, 41 VA. L. REv. 145, 154 (1955). The defendant had in its possession a report on
the toxic effect of carbon dioxide, disclosure of which might have averted an air disaster. The
essence of the breach of duty, however, was not failure to warn, but the inadequacy of the de-
vice for its intended purpose.
57. 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
[September
NOTES
tioned. More drastic still is its extension of the duty to warn to the
area of shortcomings discovered after the manufacturer's handiwork
has left his control. Logically, there is no reason not to impose such
a duty. Practically, the ramifications are enormous. The manufac-
turer probably could not have escaped liability, under the rule of this
case, by any action short of locating all the purchasers and notifying
each of them. On the other hand, the only alternative is to permit
the manufacturer to sit on his hands with full knowledge that his cre-
ation is rushing about the countryside committing mayhem. This
would be totally unacceptable.
The law has not dealt with this question of business ethics as
often as it probably has arisen. The lack of cases on the point is
probably due to the practice of basing such suits upon negligent de-
sign or production. Nevertheless, the advantages of easier proof and
restricted defense make the use of the "duty to warn" theory worthy
of consideration. The duty to warn of subsequently developed de-
fects does not depend in any way upon the presence or absence of
negligence in making or testing the product. Plaintiff, in the Corn-
stock case, did not prove that a reasonable manufacturer would not
have made a car with such brakes; nor did he prove that the de-
fendant should have discovered the defect by testing. All he proved
was that sometime after the car had left the defendant's hands, de-
fendanit learned of its lethal potential and did nothing about it.
Obviously, the problem of proving subsequent discovery of the
defect will often be insurmountable. Does the manufacturer have a
continuing duty to learn of developing infirmities, or does the duty
end with sale of the product? The possibility of proof that the de-
fendant later should have discovered a defect which developed after
the product left his control presents a totally unexplored territory.
The recent trend in the allergy cases indicates that lack of knowledge
is not a defense where the defendant might have acquired knowledge.
Upon similar reasoning, the future may see the imposition upon
manufacturers of a continuing duty to acquaint themselves with the
performance of their goods on the street and in the beauty parlor,
as well as in the laboratory and on the designing board. The ground-
work has been laid.
THE OHIO STATUTE
Any analysis, even in general terms, of the various state and fed-
eral food, drug and cosmetic acts, or similar statutes imposing duties
to warn with regard to specific kinds of products, is beyond the scope
of this note. Nevertheless, it would be grossly misleading to leave
the impression that control of labeling has been left solely to the
courts. Suffice it to say that such statutes as the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act,5 the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenti-
58. 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1958).
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cide Act,59 and their counterparts in state law, have established stand-
ards for warning-labels on products within their scope, and that the
adequacy of those standards varies greatly. Since such statutes pro-
vide minimum requirements, compliance will not necessarily absolve
the producer of liability.60 Ohio, in 1957, amended its food and drug
act to include warning requirements.6'
In 1959, a new chapter of the Revised Code was enacted, which
has no comparable antecedent in either Ohio or federal law.62 En-
titled "Labeling of Hazardous Substances," this act touches upon a
number of the areas that were found to be troublesome to the com-
mon law. The act makes it unlawful to sell, or deliver for sale, any
"misbranded package of a hazardous substance,"' 63 and defines "haz-
ardous substance" as
... any substance or mixture of substances which is toxic, corrosive, an
irritant, strong sensitizer, flammable, or which generates pressure through
decomposition, hear, or other means, if such substance or mixture of sub-
stances may cause substantial personal injury or illness during any cus-
tomary or reasonably anticipated handling or use.64
"Misbranded package" is defined as "any package of a hazardous
substance intended or suitable for household use," which, inter alia,
fails to state the name of the substance, or of each component, which
contributes to the hazard.65 The word "DANGER" must appear on
substances which are extremely flammable or corrosive, 66 or which
produce death in a certain proportion of a group of laboratory ani-
mals within a specified time.67  The signal "CAUTION," or
"WARNING" must appear on all other hazardous substances.6 In
addition, the label must display a description of the principal haz-
ard ;69 precautionary measures ;70 instructions for first-aid when neces-
sary ;71 the word "poison" on highly toxic substances ;71 instructions
59. 61 Stat. 163-72 (1947), 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-35k (1958), as amended, 73 Stat. 286 (1959),
7 U.S.C.A. § 135 (Supp. 1959).
60. Cf. Braun v. Roux Distributing Co., 312 S.W. 2d 758 (Mo. 1958).
61. See, for example, OHIO REV. CODE § 3715.64 (Supp. 1959).
62. OHIO REV. CODE ch. 3716 (Supp. 1959).
63. OHIO REV. CODE § 3716.02 (Supp. 1959).
64. OHIO REV. CODE § 3716.01 (D) (Supp. 1959). The most obvious advance exhibited
by this section is the inclusion of allergens within its provisions. Section 3716.01 (I) de-
fines "strong sensitizer" as "any substance which will cause on normal living tissue, through
an allergic or photodynamic process, a hypersensitivity which becomes evident on reapplication
of the same substance and which is designated as such by the director [of health) ..
65. OHIO REV. CODE § 3716.01(N) (1) (b) (Supp. 1959).
66. OHIO REV. CODE § 3716.01 (N) (1) (c) (Supp. 1959).
67. Section 3716.01 (N) (1) (c) (iv) gives the director of health discretion in requiring
labeling of substances which do not affect humans and animals alike.
68. OHIoREV. CODE § 3716.01(N) (1) (d) (Supp. 1959).
69. OHIo REV. CODE § 3716.01(N) (1) (e) (Supp. 1959).
70. OHIO REV. CODE § 3716.01 (N) (1) (f) (Supp. 1959).
71. OHIO REV. CODE § 3716.01 (N) (1) (g) (Supp. 1959).
72. OHIO REV. CODE § 3716.01 (N) (1) (h) (Supp. 1959).
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for handling and storage, where necessary ;73 and the statement,
"Keep out of the reach of children," or some equivalent warning.74
Excluded from the scope of this act are products regulated by the
major federal statutes and the Ohio Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.7 5
A unique feature of this enactment is that instead of dealing with
only a few products, it regulates labeling of most of the usual kinds
of dangerous household goods. Of course, the exemption of foods,
drugs, cosmetics, and all products within the federal laws curtails its
effectiveness, and goods for non-household use are beyond its pur-
view.76 Nevertheless, its impact upon tort law should be consider-
able. Suits arising under this chapter have not yet been reported, but
a few predictions may be made with some confidence.
Consistent with the construction of the former Ohio pure food
law, violation of the provisions of the "Hazardous Substances" law
will be negligence per se. Although foreseeability of the use of the
product is required by the words, "during any customary or reason-
ably anticipated handling or use," 7 it would appear that it is unneces-
sary to show foreseeability of the hazardous quality of the substance.
Upon proof that the product was in fact hazardous within the terms
of the statute, when used in a reasonably anticipated manner, plain-
tiff's burden of proving negligence should be complete. While less
than a panacea, this statute goes far in the direction of consumer pro-
tection and industrial responsibility.
CONCLUSION
Some of the decisions annotated herein may appear to stretch al-
most to the breaking point the traditional concepts of negligence, and
the new Ohio act promises liability to the manufacturer who for any
reason is ignorant of the hazards presented by his product. Are
these results desirable? The duty to warn will often require the
producer to learn more about his product, in order to know of what
he must warn. This of itself is certainly to be desired. Very often,
however, he knows quite well wherein the hazard lies. Only the
esthetic sanctity of the package, lack of imagination, and fear of
frightening buyers, prevent the producer from sharing this informa-
tion with the public. None of these is an adequate reason for deny-
ing compensation to the injured victim of failure to warn.
JOSHUA J. KANCELBAUM
73. OHio REv. CODE § 3716.01 (N) (1) (i) (Supp. 1959).
74. OHio REv. CODE § 3716.01 (N) (1) (1) (Supp. 1959).
75. OXo REv. CODE § 3716.01(N) (2) (Supp. 1959).
76. Omo REv. CODE § 3716.01(N).
77. See Rubbo v. Hughes Provision Co., 138 Ohio St. 178, 34 N.E.2d 202 (1941). It
has been held an offense to sell adulterated food even if the vendor is ignorant of the adul-
terated condition of the food. See State v. Kelly, 54 Ohio St. 166, 43 NE. 163 (1896).
78. OHO REV. CODE § 3716.01 (D) (Supp. 1959).
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